Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Medicand and Health Financing : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin v. Utah
Department of Health, Division of Medicand and
Health Financing : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nancy L. Kemp; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondents/Appellees
Robert B. Denton; Laura Boswell; Disability Law Center; Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Conley v. Utah Department of Health, No. 20100496 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2386
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICHOLAS CONLEY and PATTY OLGUIN, : 
Petitioners/Appellants, : 
v. : Case No. 20100496 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID AND 
HEALTH FINANCING, : 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Medicaid and Health Care Financing 
AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NANCY L.KEMP (5498) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
Telephone: 801-366-0533 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
Robert B. Denton (0872) 
Laura Boswell (12449) 
Disability Law Center 
205 North 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: 801-363-1347 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLEE 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICHOLAS CONLEY and PATTY OLGUIN, : 
Petitioners/Appellants, : 
v. ' • ' • : • Case No. 20100496 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID AND 
HEALTH FINANCING, 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Medicaid and Health Care Financing 
AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NANCY L. KEMP (5498) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
Telephone: 801-366-0533 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
Robert B. Denton (0872) 
Laura Boswell (12449) 
Disability Law Center 
205 North 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: 801-363-1347 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT/APPELLEE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . iii 
PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS . . . . . . v 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL .. 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES •....'.. . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . .".... . 2 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below . . . . . . . 2 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts . . . . . . . . . 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT .....' . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
I. THE "REASONABLE STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT IS 
UNRELATED TO AGE-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON OPTIONAL 
COVERAGE ..-.. 6 
II. THE "AMOUNT, DURATION, OR SCOPE" REQUIREMENT FOR 
COMPARABLE SERVICES HAS NO BEARING ON AGE-BASED 
LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . 1 1 
III. BECAUSE SACDs ARE SEPARATELY DEFINED IN FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS, THEY NEED NOT BE COVERED AS DURABLE 
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT OR PROSTHETIC DEVICES . .17 
IV. PETITIONERS'CLAIM THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL 
SUPPLIES LIST MAKES AN UNLISTED DEVICE UNAVAILABLE TO 
THEM IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 21 
CONCLUSION 22 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .23 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
A.C. Fin., Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
948 P.2d 771 (Utah 1997) . . 17 
B hazard v. Utah Dep't of Health, 
861 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 2 
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 
2007 UT 72,167 P.3d 1080 . . . 9 
Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 
924 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Tex. 1996) 16 
Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 
117 F.3d 1416 (5th Cir. 1997) '. 16 
FredC. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 
988 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Tex. 1997) . . . ' . ' . . . . 16 
Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 
167 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1998) 17,21 
Gottlingv. P.R. Inc., 
2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989 22 
Hern v. Beye, 
57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1995) 7-8 
Hodecker v. Blum, 
525 F. Supp. 867 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) 12 
Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 
2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d281 20-21 
Lankford v. Sherman, 
451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006) 15 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Lyon v. Burton, 
2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616 9 
Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
Masich v. US. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 
113 Utah 101,191 P.2d 612 (1948) 22 
McMillan v. McCrimon, 
807 F. Supp. 475 (CD. 111. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 
Meyers v.Reagan, 
776F.2d241 (8thGir. 1985) 15-16 
Salgado v. Kirschner, 
179 Ariz. 301, 878 P.2d 659 (1994) 16 
Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 
890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995) . . 17-18 
Sobkyv. Smoley, 
855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Gal. 1994) 12 
State v. Duncan, 
812P.2d60 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Hunt, 
906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995) 17 
Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Graham, 
892 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Utah 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; ; , . . . . . . . . . 7 
William T.v. Taylor, 
465 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000) ,....;... 9-11,16, 21-22 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111 -264 (excluding 
P.L. 111-203,111-257, and 111-259) approved 10-8-10) 6, 8,12,15 
42U.S.C.A. § 1396d (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding 
P.L. 111-203 and 111-240) approved 10-5-10) 7-8,14 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding 
P.L.111-203 and 111-240) approved 10-5-10) 4 
42 C.F.R. § 440.70(2010) .'.. 8,10,13,16 
42 C.F.R. § 440.110 (2010) . . 7-8, 13 
42 C.F.R. § 440.120(2010) 19 
42 C.F.R. § 440.200 (2010) 12 
42 C.F.R. § 440.210 (2010) 12,18 
42 C.F.R. § 440.220 (2010) " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2010) 11 
42 C.F.R. § 441.15 (2010) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009) 1 
Utah Admin. Code R414-54-4 14 
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-2 18 
' PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS 
To the best knowledge of respondent/appellee, there are no prior or related judicial 
appeals in this matter. 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICHOLAS CONLEY and PATTY OLGUIN, : 
Petitioners/Appellants, : 
v. : Case No. 20100496 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, : 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID AND 
HEALTH FINANCING, : 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Medicaid and Health Care Financing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Petition for Review of this Medicaid claim is taken from the Final Agency 
Order of the Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, issued on 
May 20,2010. R. 97-98. The order adopted the Recommended Decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), R. 99-109, denying petitioners' requests for Medicaid-
provided speech augmentative communication devices (SACDs). Petitioners' timely 
petition for review was filed on June 18,2010. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 
2009) gives this Court jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies." -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
Did the Utah Department of Health unreasonably deny SACDs for petitioners as 
non-covered benefits in violation of the Medicaid Act's "reasonable standards" and 
"amount, duration, or scope," or comparability of services, requirements? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This appeal requires us to construe federal and state 
statutes, regulations and rules governing the Medicaid program. Thus, it presents 
questions of law" that are reviewed for correctness. Bleazardv. Utah Dep't of Health, 
861 P.2d 1048,1049(UtahApp. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the 
issue before the Court is contained in the body of this brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Petitioners each filed a timely Request for Hearing/Agency Action after having 
sought and been denied an SACD. R. 5 and 30 (denial: Conley), 1 (Request for Hearing: 
Conley), 8 and 44 (denial: Olguin), 7 (Request for Hearing: Olguin). Following the 
filing of prehearing memoranda (R. 13-47: petitioners; 50-77: respondent; 81-96: 
petitioners' reply), the matter was submitted to the ALJ. The ALJ issued a Recommended 
Decision on May 18,2010, affirming the denials as reasonable on the ground that under 
Utah's Medicaid program, the devices are non-covered benefits for individuals over 21 
years of age. R. 99-109. The Utah Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and 
2 
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Health Financing ( Department) reviewed and adopted the Recommended Decision in its 
entirety two days later. R. 97-98. This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The ALJ stated that "[t]he facts are not in dispute. Both Petitioner [sic] and 
Respondent submitted statements of fact, and while in different format, contain the same 
information. Those fact statements are hereby adopted for the purposes of this decision." 
R. 103. As enumerated in Respondent's prehearing memorandum, the facts are as 
follows: 
Nicholas Conley 
1. Nicholas is a 22 year old male with spastic quadriplegia related to 
cerebral palsy. 
2. Nicholas has limited motor control and uses a power wheelchair for 
mobility purposes. 
3. Nicholas is not able to produce any intelligible words due to motor 
difficulties secondary to his medical diagnosis. 
4. Nicholas uses a Dynamite 3100 augmented speech device to 
communicate. 
5. Nicholas* Dynamite 3100 is seven years old and not functioning properly 
and has a recent history of needing repeated repairs. 
6. When the Dynamite 3100 is not working, Nicholas attempts to express 
himself using gestures, facial expressions and pointing to objects. 
7. The cost of repairing Nicholas1 Dynamite 3100 far exceeds the cost of a 
new device. 
8. Based on an evaluation, Nicholas's care providers determined that a 
Dynavox VMax currently will meet Nicholas* communication needs. 
9. A request for prior authorization for a Dynavox VMax was submitted to 
the respondent. 
10. The respondent denied the request on February 22, 2010, stating that 
the service is not a covered benefit. 
Patty Olguin 
11. Patty is a 38 year old female who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis 
attheageof8. 
3 
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12. In 2002, Patty suffered a stroke during a surgical operation to her leg 
which caused severe dysarthria, a motor speech disorder resulting from a 
neurological injury. 
13. Patty's care provider recently evaluated her communication ability and 
determined that a Dynavox V and related accessories are necessary to meet 
her functional communication needs. 
14. A request for a prior authorization for the Dynavox V was submitted to 
the respondent. 
15. The request was denied on February 22, 2010, stating the service is not 
a covered benefit. 
R.51-52. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners1 argument begins by "refraining" the ALJ's decision and starting from 
the premise that all state Medicaid provisions must be measured against the Medicaid 
Act's "reasonable standards" requirement in fulfillment of the Act's broad objectives: to 
furnish medical assistance, rehabilitation, and other services to help disabled individuals 
"attain or retain capability for independence or self-care." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1 (West, 
Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203 and 111-240) approved 10-5-10). 
Petitioners complain that the ALJ erroneously started from the principle that states have 
substantial discretion in developing and implementing their plans and, by doing so, gave 
undue weight to "specific Medicaid statutes, regulations, Utah state administrative rules, 
and the Agency's policies." Pet'r Brief at 11. But to accept petitioners' framework would 
deprive states of any of the discretion to which the Act entitles them. 
The ALJ correctly focused on the precise requirements of the Act, as implemented 
by Utah's federally approved plan. She then looked at whether those requirements 
4 
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violated the Act's general provisions regarding "reasonable standards" and "amount, 
duration, or scope" of coverage, concluding that they did not. Petitioners have not 
addressed the ALJPs rationale for concluding that neither the "reasonable standards" nor 
the "amount, duration, or scope" provisions are applicable to the question of whether 
optional coverage can be restricted on the basis of age. 
The ALJfs conclusions are supported by the relevant statutes, regulations, and 
rules. Under the federal act and associated regulations, speech pathology services are not 
a mandatory coverage category for adults. Even under plans that cover "home health 
services," federal regulations defining that term explicitly exclude speech pathology 
services from mandatory coverage, and Utah does not cover them as a general benefit. 
While the Act does require necessary health care services to correct or ameliorate defects 
and conditions identified in Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of 21-regardless 
of whether those services are covered under the state plan-nothing in the Act mandates 
extension of optional coverage to adults. If it did, such coverage would no longer be 
optional-a result contrary to the plain language of the Act. Utah statutes and rules do no 
more than implement what is required and what is permitted under the federal legislation. 
Moreover, Utah's Medicaid program, in compliance with statutory requirements, has been 
approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, confirming that it is consistent 
with federal Medicaid law. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the decision of the Utah 
Department of Health warrants this Court's affirmance. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE "REASONABLE STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT IS 
UNRELATED TO AGE-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON OPTIONAL 
COVERAGE 
Petitioners' argument relies substantially on the concept that the Act's "reasonable 
standards" provision mandates a general reasonableness test for all Medicaid decisions. 
In making that assumption, petitioners fail to acknowledge the statutory context of the 
"reasonable standards" language. A careful examination shows that, as the ALJ correctly 
concluded, the "reasonable standards" requirement speaks to "financial eligibility such as 
income and resources, and insures that individuals are not wrongly denied general 
assistance on the basis of their financial standing. It does not reach the issue of medical 
eligibility or need, and there is no question that both Petitioners are financially qualified 
to receive Medicaid." R. 104. To the extent that the "reasonable standards" requirement 
applies to "determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the 
plan[J" it mandates only that the extent of medical assistance is not unfairly curtailed on 
the basis of inequitably applied financial criteria. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West, 
Westlaw through PL. 111-264 (excludmgPX. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259) approved 
10-8-10). But petitioners' financial qualification for services is not at issue here. 
The text of the statute supports the ALJ's conclusion. The "reasonable standards" 
requirement is found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17), which sets forth eligibility criteria 
for financial assistance under four subsections. While subsection (A) requires that the 
eligibility criteria be consistent with the objectives of the subchapter, subsections (B), 
6 
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(C), and (D) set out limitations on what income and resources can be considered and how 
they should be evaluated. Nothing in the text suggests a broader applicability to non-
financial decisions. The "reasonable standards" requirement lacks any bearing on the 
validity of a limitation based on age. 
Petitioners contend that the Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 
906 (10th Cir. 1995), and the federal district court decision in Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. 
v. Graham, 892 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Utah 1995), support their position that the "reasonable 
standards" requirement limits the state's discretion to deny them access to SACDs. But, 
as the Hern court noted, "This circuit, as well as several other courts, has interpreted Title 
XIX and its accompanying regulations as imposing a general obligation on states to fund 
those mandatory coverage services that are medically necessary." Hern, 57 F.3d at 911 
(emphasis added). See also id. ("Title XIX . . . mandates that [seven] basic categories of 
medical assistance be provided to all categorically needy persons when the assistance is 
medically necessary.'") (quoting Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980)) 
(alterations in Herri). Utah Women fs Clinic does no more than follow Hern. 
The seven mandatory services are inpatient services, outpatient services, 
laboratory and x-ray services, nursing facility services, physicians' services, nurse-
midwife services (if authorized by state law), and services of certified pediatric or family 
nurse practitioners. But these categories do not include the provision of SACDs. Instead, 
federal regulations specifically address SACDs in 42 C.F.R. 440.110, which defines the 
optional category of physical therapy and related services found at 42 U.S.C.A. 
7 
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§ 1396d(a)(l 1). Under 42 C.F.R. 440.110 (c) (2010), captioned "Services for individuals 
with speech, hearing, and language disorders[,]" subsection (1) includes "any necessary 
supplies and equipment." A second optional category, found at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1396d(a)(7), is "home health care services," a category that Utah has chosen to cover. 
The federal regulations defining that term show that, under this optionally-covered 
category, nursing service, home health aide service, and medical supplies, equipment, and 
appliances suitable for home use must be covered, but speech pathology services need not 
be. See 42 C.F.R. 440.70(b)(4) (2010). Whatever Hern may mean with respect to the 
seven mandatory coverage categories, it has no applicability to the optional services 
petitioners seek. 
McMillan v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475 (CD. 111. 1992), cited without analysis 
by petitioners, is not to the contrary. The McMillan case dealt with Illinois1 refusal to 
accept applications for the home services program (HSP) of the state's Medicaid plan, an 
optional coverage category that Illinois chose to provide, under an emergency budget 
reduction measure. The court concluded that "[tjhe fact that the HSP is an optional 
service does not exempt it from the requirements of section 1396a(a)(8)." McMillan, 807 
F. Supp. at 481-82. Section 1396a(a)(8) requires that a state plan must "provide that all 
individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have 
opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable 
promptness to all eligible individuals^]" 42 U.S,C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West, Westlaw 
throughP.L. 111-264(excludingP.L. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259)approved 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10-8-10).: In the present case, petitioners were not precluded from applying for medical 
assistance, nor were they denied benefits for which they are eligible. McMillan has no 
application here. 
Even if the Court were to conclude that the "reasonable standards" requirement 
applies to medical, as well as financial, decisions, the rules of statutory construction do 
not permit the result petitioners seek. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, in resolving a 
conflict between two legal provisions, the more specific provision will prevail over the 
more general. R. 104. The regulations making coverage of speech pathology services 
and their related supplies and equipment optional are specifically targeted in a way that 
the general "reasonable standards" requirement is not. Under well established Utah 
precedents, these explicit regulations must govern: "We acknowledge the well-settled 
principle of statutory construction that Vhen two provisions address the same subject 
matter and one provision is general while the other is specific, the specific provision 
controls.1" Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, 
% 19, 167 P.3d 1080 (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882 
P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994); accord Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616. 
Given the clear language placing SACDs outside the mandatory coverage categories, and 
even outside required coverage under the optional category of home health care services, 
petitioners' "reasonable standards" argument cannot succeed. 
Nor does William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000), establish 
that limitation of SACDs to minors violates the "reasonable standards" provision. 
9 
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Acknowledging that speech pathology services are an optional category, the court in that 
case found it "undisputed that Georgia has elected to cover these services." William T., 
465 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. The court noted that "the State does not oppose plaintiffs' 
contention that ACDs should be covered under Georgia's plan for medical assistance." Id. 
at 1285. See also id. at 1286 (observing that "[defendants do not contradict" plaintiffs' 
contention that ACDs meet all the criteria for durable medical equipment and that 
"defendants do not address plaintiffs' contention that ACDs meet the criteria for 
prosthetic devices"); id. at 1287 (stating that "[a]s defendants do not address plaintiffs' 
contention that ACDs meet the criteria for SLP [speech language pathology] equipment, it 
appears that they do not oppose plaintiffs' [summary judgment] motion in this regard."). 
Moreover, the court expressly "reserve[d] ruling on the scope of any injunctive relief to 
be granted in this case until after the completion of the parties' efforts to draft a 
reasonable ACD coverage criteria [sic]". Id. at 1289. The court left open the question of 
whether limiting SACD coverage to beneficiaries under the age of 21 would violate the 
Medicaid Act's "reasonable standards" and "amount, duration, and scope" provisions or a 
September 4, 1998 policy letter from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) 
providing guidance on coverage of mandatory services. Id. at 1288-89. In fact, the court 
expressed skepticism about the letter's entitlement to deference, but concluded it was 
bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent deferring to HCFA transmittal letters. See Point II, 
below. In light of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the court did not address 
the language of 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4), exempting speech pathology services from 
10 
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mandatory coverage under the optional category of home health services (if included in 
the state plan). Given Georgia's apparent lack of opposition to including SAGDs in the 
sate plan and the absence of a definitive ruling regarding the coverage criteria, William T 
bears little weight as to what "reasonable standards" require. 
II. THE "AMOUNT, DURATION, OR SCOPE" REQUIREMENT FOR 
COMPARABLE SERVICES HAS NO BEARING ON AGE-BASED 
LIMITATIONS 
Petitioners also assert that the denial of SACDs violates the Act's provision 
requiring comparability of services-that medical assistance be the same in amount, 
duration, or scope among all qualifying individuals. However, petitioners have not 
argued that they are being deprived of benefits that are being provided to other qualifying 
persons. Instead, they argue that they are being denied SACDs solely on the basis of age. 
But, as the ALJ correctly observed, "denial on the basis of age is not one of the 
prohibitions contained in this provision." R. 105. Instead, under 42 C.F.R. 440.230(c) 
(2010), "[t]he Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration, 
or scope of a required service under §§ 440.210 [for the categorically needy] and 440.220 
[for the medically needy] to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the 
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition" (emphasis added). Petitioners1 argument is doubly 
flawed: first, because the services they seek are not required, and second, because 
nothing in the comparability language forecloses the application of an age-based standard. 
Consequently, the "amount, duration, or scope" requirement does nothing to assist their 
age-based claim. Petitioners have provided no binding authority supporting the 
11 
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proposition that an age-based limitation on an optional service is a violation of the 
"amount, duration, or scope" requirement. 
Petitioners' citation to Hodecker v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 867 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), is not 
on point. In Hodecker\ the issue was whether the state's Commissioner of Social Services 
could treat the income of financially responsible relatives differently in the process of 
qualifying adults and minors for services. The comparability requirement was violated by 
the application of different methodologies to determine adults' and minors' financial 
eligibility. The case has no bearing on whether different services can be limited to 
minors. 
Sobkyv. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1994), is equally unavailing. In 
Sobky, the issue was whether the state could permit individual counties to determine, in 
their discretion, "the appropriate mix and level of drug abuse services needed in the 
community." 855 F. Supp. at 1128. The court concluded that the local discretion given to 
counties ran afoul of the Medicaid requirement that a state plan "shall be in effect in all 
political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon 
them[J" 42 U.S.C.A. § I396a(a)(l) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-264 (excluding 
P.L. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259) approved 10-8-10). There is no question in 
petitioners' case that the same standards are applied statewide. 
42 CF.R. § 440.200 implements the statute requiring comparability of services. It 
distinguishes between mandatory and optional coverage categories. See 42 CF.R. 
§ 440.210 (identifying the seven statutory coverage categories mandated for the 
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categorically needy, plus mandatory coverage for certain pregnancy-related services and 
services for eligible aliens); 42 C.F.R. § 440.220 (identifying required services for the 
medically needy under state plans that choose to cover them). The mandatory services for 
the medically needy, which Utah's plan covers, do include home health services, as 
defined in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70, for those individuals entitled to skilled nursing facility 
services. But under home health services, as explained in Point I, above, coverage for 
speech pathology services is optional, not mandated. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). And, 
under 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1) (2010), those optional services for individuals with 
speech disorders include "any necessary supplies and equipment." 
42 C.F.R. § 441.15 (2010), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary. It regulates 
home health services "as defined in § 440.70 of this subchapter." Although subsection 
(a)(3) requires coverage for medical supplies, equipment, and appliances, that 
requirement is subject to section 440.70's definition of home health services-which, as 
shown above, excludes speech pathology services (and, under section 440.110(c)(1), 
related supplies and equipment). See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). To read the regulation as 
requiring coverage of SACDs for adults would render subsection (b)(4) a nullity-a result 
this Court does not condone. "In asking us to rule that an entire sentence of the statute 
had absolutely no meaning at all, [defendants] have ignored our fundamental duty to give 
effect, if possible, to every word of the statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,252 
n.ll (Utah 1988); see also State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Madsen). 
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Utah's Medicaid plan complies folly with controlling federal law. Under Utah 
Admin. Code R414-54-4(1), "Speech-language pathology services are available only to 
clients who are pregnant women or who are individuals eligible under the Early and 
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program." Petitioners are neither. 
The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program is 
established by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) to provide services as defined in subsection 
(r) to eligible individuals under the age of 21. Subsections (r)( 1) through (4) contain 
minimum requirements for screening, vision, dental, and hearing services. Subsection 
(r)(5) requires state plans to provide M[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic 
services, treatment, and other measures described in subsection (a) of this section to 
correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered 
by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan" 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(r)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203 
and 111-240) approved 10-5-10) (emphasis added). Subsection (a) includes all 29 
enumerated categories of services, only seven of which are mandatory coverage 
categories. See Point I, above. In other words, while the Act mandates that EPSDT 
recipients be provided coverage in all 29 categories-optional as well as mandatory-it 
permits states to differentiate between minors and adults by providing coverage under 
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only the seven mandated categories for non-EPSDT individuals-persons over the age of 
2 0 i . . . . . . • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • - - • 
Lankford v. Sherman, one of the cases cited by petitioners, makes this distinction 
clear. In Lankford, disabled adult Medicaid recipients challenged a state regulation that 
precluded durable medical equipment (DME) as a stand-alone benefit except to 
individuals who are blind, pregnant, needy children, or recipients of home health care 
benefits under the Act. A limited list of DME was available to all other adult Medicaid 
recipients. In an action seeking to enjoin the regulation, the court noted the plaintiffs' 
agreement that under the Act, the state "may lawfully provide additional benefits only to 
needy children and pregnant women[,]fr Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 
2006)-precisely what Utah's plan does here. 
Petitioners point to Meyers v. Reagan, 116 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1985), as precedent 
for requiring a state plan to fund SACDs for adults. In that case, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that Iowa's Medicaid plan included the optional category of physical therapy and related 
services. Observing that related services included professional assistance for persons 
with speech disorders, the court concluded that Iowa could not deny the plaintiff an 
^ h e coverage Utah provides for pregnant women is equally unavailing to 
petitioners. Under the Act, a state plan that makes available to pregnant women services 
relating to any conditions that may complicate pregnancy does not require the state to 
supply "such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals, 
provided such services are made available (in the same amount, duration, and scope) to 
all pregnant women covered under the State planf.]" 42U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(G)(V) 
(West, Westlaw through PX. 111-264 (excluding PX. 111-203,111^257, and 111-259) 
approved 10-8-10). 
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SACD. Meyers is distinguishable from the case at bar on two grounds. First, there was 
no issue in Meyers regarding age. Second, Meyers was decided in 1985-four years before 
the EPSDT program, requiring the provision of a broad range of services to minors 
regardless of whether they were made available to nonpregnant adults, was strengthened 
by 1989 amendments to the federal Medicaid Act. Under these circumstances, Meyers 
cannot serve as precedent to mandate the expansion of EPSDT services to adult Medicaid 
recipients. In addition, .Meyers, like William T, contains no mention, let alone analysis, 
of 42 C.F,R. 440.70(b)(4)ts exclusion of speech pathology services. 
Nor does Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 924 F. Supp. 788 
(W.D. Tex. 1996), require the result petitioners seek. In reaching its conclusion that 
SACDs could not be restricted to minors under the EPSDT program, the district court 
cited to Salgado v. Kirschner, 179 Ariz. 301, 878 P.2d 659 (1994). But the Salgado case 
dealt with organ transplants, which are governed by a different statute requiring like 
treatment for similarly situated individuals. See 878 P.2d at 662. Moreover, the Fred C 
opinion to which petitioners cite was vacated and remanded by the Fifth Circuit for a 
determination of whether the plaintiff was a qualified recipient of home health services. 
Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 117 F.3d 1416 (5th Cir. 1997). The 
district court's decision on remand was essentially the same as the former decision. Fred 
C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm% 988 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Tex. 1997). On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was bound by its prior remand order not to 
revisit issues outside the scope of the remand. It did, however, state: "Accordingly, in 
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affirming the district court's second summary judgment, we are not passing on the 
correctness of, nor do we adopt, the district court's opinion; we hold merely that 
reconsideration of the issues presented in the first appeal is barred under the law of the 
case doctrine." Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Conim'n, 167 F.3d 537 (5th 
Cir. 1998), 1998 WL 915385 at *3. The Fifth Circuit's unenthusiastic affirmance of the 
district court's opinion suggests that it may have arrived at a different decision had it 
exercised jurisdiction 'to engage in a full review. 
Reading the statute as broadly as petitioners suggest would obliterate the 
distinction between mandated and optional categories, rendering the latter inoperative. 
The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned against such a result under "the rule of 
construction requiring us to give meaning to all provisions in a statute." A.C. Fin., Inc. v. 
Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1997). As the court observed, "'any 
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be 
avoided.'" State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United States v. 
Rawlings, S21 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987)). Because petitioners'interpretation 
would nullify the state's statutory discretion under the Act's plain language, it cannot be 
credited. 
III. BECAUSE SACDs ARE SEPARATELY DEFINED IN FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS, THEY NEED NOT BE COVERED AS DURABLE 
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT OR PROSTHETIC DEVICES 
"'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy 
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Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (quoting Hanchett v. 
Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135, 202 PI 377, 379-80 (1921)). Because the language of the 
federal regulations explicitly and unambiguously addresses equipment related to speech 
pathology services, there is no room to speculate that SACDs may also fit into other 
categories of coverage such as durable medical equipment (DME) or prosthetic devices. 
Even if they could, the more specific provisions are controlling, as shown above. 
Petitioners concede that ff[t]here is no definition of DME in the Medicaid Act or its 
implementing regulations." Pet'r Brief at 16. As defined in Utah's administrative code, 
'"Durable medical equipment' or fDMEf means equipment that: (a) can withstand repeated 
use; (b) is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose; (c) generally is not 
useful to a person in the absence of an illness or injury; and (d) is suitable for use in the 
home." Utah Admin. Code R414-70-2(l). The Department does not deny that SACDs 
may fit under this description. But so may a number of other devices or kinds of 
equipment that Medicaid does not cover for nonpregnant adults, such as hearing aids and 
eyeglasses. While durable medical equipment must meet the defining criteria, petitioners 
make the logical error of presuming that anything meeting the criteria must be a covered 
device. As explained in Points I and II, above, SACDs, as equipment necessary to speech 
pathology services, are specifically excluded from the coverage mandated by 42 C.F.R. 
§ 440.210(a)(1) for home health services for the categorically needy. That they may meet 
the definitional criteria for DME does not change this fact. 
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The same principles apply to petitioners* attempt to categorize SACDs as 
prosthetic devices. Under federal regulations, prosthetic devices are 
replacement, corrective, or supportive devices prescribed by a physician or 
other licensed practitioner of the healing arts within the scope of his 
practice as defined by State law to~ 
(1) Artificially replace a missing portion of the body; 
(2) Prevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction; or 
(3) Support a weak or deformed portion of the body. 
42 C.F.R. § 440.120(c) (2010). But, as above, even if the definition can be construed to 
include SACDs, it does not alter the fact that coverage of SACDs falls outside the federal 
mandate. Meeting the criteria for definition as a prosthetic device is not the same as 
meeting the criteria for coverage. Petitioners1 argument proves the point. Petitioners state 
that 49 states cover SACDs for adults as DME, and seven states cover them both as DME 
and prosthetic devices. Pet'r Brief at 15. If the definitional criteria were, by themselves, 
sufficient to require inclusion of SACDs, every state would have to cover them under 
both categories. 
That other states may have chosen to cover SACDs as DME or prosthetic devices 
is irrelevant to whether Utah's plan complies with federal law. As the Department 
explained in its Prehearing Response Memorandum, in order to participate in the 
Medicaid program, state Medicaid plans must be approved by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS). R. 52. This approval "indicates federal confirmation that a state's Medicaid 
program is in compliance with federal Medicaid law." R. 54. As a CMS-approved plan, 
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R. 58, Utah's Medicaid plan has been scrutinized and passed for compliance with federal 
standards. If limiting SACDs to pregnant women and EPSDT recipients were not in 
keeping with federal law, the state plan could not have been approved. And ,f[w]ith 
Utah's state plan not providing the optional service of speech pathology to general 
Medicaid recipients, Utah Medicaid would be out of compliance with its state plan and 
federal Medicaid law if Utah Medicaid began covering speech augmentation devices that 
fall within this non-covered service." R. 54. 
IV. PETITIONERS'CLAIM THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL 
SUPPLIES LIST MAKES AN UNLISTED DEVICE UNAVAILABLE TO 
THEM IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
f
"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record 
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon.'" Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, f 26, 8 
P.3d 281 (quoting Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989)) 
(emphasis omitted and added in Holmstrom). On appeal, petitioners raise for the first 
time a claim that the Department's list of medical supplies constitutes a categorical denial 
of all unlisted devices that violates federal Medicaid guidelines under a September 4, 
1998 letter to state Medicaid directors. This contention appears nowhere in the 
administrative record. As this Court further observedin Holmstrom, 
Moreover, the party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought 
"to a/level of consciousness'before the trial court.,f This requirement 
fserve[s] the interests of judicial economy and orderly procedure" by not 
only giving the trial court a chance to correct error, but by making the 
parties "crystallize issues prior to appeal." When issues are not brought to 
2G 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial court's attention in a timely manner, they are "deemed waived, 
precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal." 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in Holmstrom). Because petitioners did not 
raise and the ALJ did not rule on this issue in the course of the administrative 
proceedings, petitioners have waived it for purposes of appeal. 
Even if the Court chooses to address this newly raised claim, it is without merit. 
Notably, the federal district court in William T. expressed doubt about the credibility of 
the HCFAfs September 4, 1998 guidance letter, but concluded it was bound by the 
Eleventh Circuit's demonstrated deference to HCFA transmittals: 
This Court is somewhat skeptical about according a letter the same 
deference as a regulation. In this court's experience, letters written by 
officials in a bureaucracy are sometimes inconsistent with each other and 
have not undergone the focus of a review and comment process that 
accompanies the promulgation of a regulation. Chevroris deference toward 
an administrative agency's interpretation already gives that agency great 
power in effectively acting as a legislative body; further deferring to the 
agency's letters interpreting its own regulations arguably expands Chevron 
beyond its own language and beyond the limits of prudence. Indeed, the 
Eleventh Circuit has noted that "a rule would be preferable," but has also 
tempered this observation with a recognition that "the agency is not 
required to promulgate rules pursuant to everysubsection of the widely-
acknowledged complex Medicaid statute." The Eleventh Circuit has further 
held that this is especially true when "HCFA spoke directly to the states on 
this question through [a transmittal], which we recognize as administrative 
practice." Accordingly, the Court believes that it must defer to the 
transmittal letter in question. 
William T., 465 F. Supp.2d at 1280 n.12 (internal citations omitted; alteration in original). 
As in Fred C , this qualified endorsement suggests that a court not bound by precedent 
may well reach a different conclusion regarding deference to the HCFA letter. 
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In fact, the HCFA letter does not preclude states from developing and using non-
exclusive lists of pre-approved DME, so long as they provide a reasonable and 
meaningful procedure for requesting nonlisted items. 465 F. Supp. at 1279. That is 
exactly what happened in the present case. The record shows that the letters denying 
petitioners1 requests for SACDs apprised petitioners of their right to appeal the decision 
(R. 30 and 44), and both petitioners took advantage of that opportunity by appealing the 
decision to the ALJ. The administrative process provided them the opportunity to submit 
prehearing briefs and participate in an evidentiary hearing. The ALPs recommended 
decision informed petitioners that it would be automatically reviewed by the Department 
director, R. 108, which resulted in a final agency order. R. 97-98. In light of those 
extensive administrative proceedings, a claim that petitioners lacked a reasonable and 
meaningful procedure for requesting the devices is unsupportable. The process is not 
unreasonable or meaningless simply because it did not yield petitioners' preferred result. 
CONCLUSION 
"This court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it is either wise or unwise. 
The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature to determine. If the act is unjust, 
amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial 
interpretation." Masich v. U.S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,126, 191 
P.2d 612, 625 (1948); see also Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ^  23, 61 P.3d 989 
(quoting Masich). That the legislature has chosen to commit the state's limited resources 
to providing enhanced medical assistance for children, in compliance with its duties under 
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the Medicaid Act's EPSDT program, is not a reason to second-guess the legislative 
wisdom. Because the controlling statutes, rules, and regulations give the state discretion 
over whether to cover optional Medicaid categories for general Medicaid recipients, the 
Department correctly determined that the rule providing SACDs only to minors does not 
violate the Medicaid Act. The Department therefore respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm its decision. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Department believes oral argument is necessary due to the complexity of the 
issue before the Court. 
Dated this day of January, 2011. 
Nancy L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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